Decision Making Under Information Asymmetry: Experimental Evidence on Belief Refinements by Schmidt, William & Buell, Ryan Williams
 
Decision Making Under Information Asymmetry: Experimental
Evidence on Belief Refinements
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Schmidt, William, and Ryan W. Buell. "Decision Making Under
Information Asymmetry: Experimental Evidence on Belief
Refinements." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-
001, July 2014.
Accessed February 17, 2015 4:47:45 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13350442
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP 
Copyright © 2014 by William Schmidt and Ryan W. Buell 
Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and 
discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working 
papers are available from the author. 
 
 
Decision Making Under 
Information Asymmetry: 
Experimental Evidence on 
Belief Refinements  
 
William Schmidt 








July 20, 2014 
 Decision Making Under Information Asymmetry:
Experimental Evidence on Belief Renements
William Schmidt , Ryan W. Buelly
July 20, 2014
Abstract
We explore how individuals make decisions in an operations management setting when there
is information asymmetry between the rm and an outside investor. A common assumption
in the signaling game literature is that beliefs among the participants in the game are rened
using the Intuitive Criterion renement. Our experimental results provide evidence that the
predictive power of this renement is quite low, and that the Undefeated renement better
captures actual choice behavior. This is surprising because the Intuitive Criterion renement is
the most commonly utilized belief renement in the literature while the Undefeated renement is
rarely employed. Our results have material implications for both research and practice because
the Undefeated and Intuitive Criterion renements often produce divergent predictions. Our
results demonstrate that conformance to the Undefeated and Intuitive Criterion renements
is inuenced by changes in the underlying newsvendor model parameters. We also show that
adherence to the Undefeated renement is especially pronounced among subjects who report a
high level of understanding of the game and that subjects whose choices conformed with the
predictions of the Undefeated renement were rewarded by investors with higher payos in the
game. Finally, we demonstrate, through a reexamination of Cachon and Lariviere (2001), how
the application of the Undefeated renement can substantively extend the implications of extant
signaling game theory in the operations management literature.
The Johnson School, Cornell University, Sage Hall, Ithaca NY 14853. E-mail: wschmidt@cornell.edu.
yHarvard Business School, Soldiers Field Park, Boston MA 02163. E-mail: rbuell@hbs.edu.1 Introduction
Managers are often required to make decisions in settings with information asymmetry, including
new product introductions (Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997), competitive entry (Anand and
Goyal 2009), supplier contracts (Cachon and Lariviere 2001), and capacity investments (Lai et al.
2012). Although game theorists have created a variety of tools to aid in the analysis of such
decisions, these tools can produce an abundance of justiable outcomes. Unfortunately, having a
model that predicts that anything can happen is about as useful for practical decision making as
having no model at all. To address this, researchers have developed an assortment of renement
mechanisms that pare down the set of equilibrium outcomes by imposing assumptions about how
participants in the decision setting form their beliefs. Not only can dierent renements produce
dramatically dierent predicted outcomes, they may also have dierent predictive power in practical
operations management settings. Despite this, the question of which renement mechanisms to
employ has received little attention in the operations management literature. This is surprising
given the wide range of applied issues that game theory has been used to study in operations
management.
To shed light on this issue, we examine whether decision makers' choices conform to the predic-
tions of dierent renement mechanisms through a controlled experiment in a context relevant to
operations management { a capacity expansion decision. We analyze a setting between a manager
of a rm (hereafter, the rm) and an equity holder of the rm (hereafter, the investor). As detailed
in Section 3.1, the rm faces stochastic demand which can be either \Big" or \Small". The quality
of the demand is revealed to the rm but not to the investor due to information asymmetry between
them. The rm is interested in both its long-term performance and the short-term share price set
by the investor. The investor is interested in setting a short-term share price that is as accurate as
possible. The rm moves rst by making a store capacity decision which may provide the investor
with information about the true nature of the rm's demand. There is abundant empirical evi-
dence that rms facing short-term investor pressures manipulate long-term investments, including
property, plant and equipment (Kedia and Philippon 2009), capital expenditures (McNichols and
Stubben 2008), and research and development (Dechow and Sloan 1991, Bushee 1998).
We focus on testing the predictive power of two sets of renement mechanisms. The rst is
based generally on equilibrium dominance and represented by the Intuitive Criterion renement.
1The second is based on Pareto optimization logic and represented by the Undefeated renement.
The assumptions reected in our experiment1 are commonly used in the signaling game literature
(Kreps and Sobel 1992). The predicted outcomes in our experiments, and from signaling game
models generally, are sensitive to whether the Undefeated renement or the Intuitive Criterion
renement is applied. The choice of which renement to employ is at the discretion of the researcher,
underscoring the importance of the contribution we make in testing the practical validity of the
dierent outcomes predicted by these renement methods.
Our ndings represent a signicant contribution to the literature as they provide the rst evi-
dence that the Undefeated renement is more predictive of operations management decisions made
under information asymmetry than the more commonly applied Intuitive Criterion renement.
This result is accentuated among participants who report a high level of understanding of the
game. Furthermore, participants whose decisions are congruent with the predictions of the Unde-
feated renement earn higher payos from investors than those whose decisions are congruent with
the predictions of the Intuitive Criterion renement. We also show that subject conformance to
these renements is sensitive to changes in the underlying newsvendor model parameters. Finally,
we highlight some of the implications for the operations management literature by detailing in
Section 7 how the insights from Cachon and Lariviere (2001) can be expanded upon through the
application of the Undefeated renement.
2 Literature Review
Our experimental examination of how people behave under information asymmetry builds on two
streams of scholarship, as described below.
2.1 Empirical Evidence for Deviations from Model-Based Rules
We contribute to a broad literature that seeks to explain why managers make operational decisions
that do not maximize long-term expected prots. Deshpande et al. (2003) and van Donselaar et al.
(2010) use large sample observational data to show that decisions in practice dier from those
which would theoretically maximize the rm's performance. Several experimental studies have
identied that decision makers may deviate from the expected-prot-maximizing capacity choice
1Two players, one costly signal, two types of the informed player, and the single crossing property holds.
2due to decision biases, including anchoring, demand chasing, and inventory error minimization
(Schweitzer and Cachon 2000, Bolton and Katok 2008, Bostian et al. 2008, Kremer et al. 2010).
Although the payos in our experiment are developed using the newsvendor model, subjects are
not directly exposed to the newsvendor model. As a result, our research identies another possible
explanation for suboptimal investment levels in practical settings. Specically, we explore how
decision makers behave when information asymmetry exists and managers have utility functions
that are inuenced by short term share-price concerns.
There is abundant empirical evidence that suggests that rms manipulate investment levels in
the presence of information asymmetry with investors. Evidence of such manipulations have been
found with both long-term investments, such as capital expenditures (McNichols and Stubben 2008)
and research and development (Dechow and Sloan 1991, Bushee 1998, Roychowdhury 2006), as well
as shorter-term investments, such as inventory levels (Thomas and Zhang 2002) and maintenance
expenditures (Roychowdhury 2006). These papers suggest that such deviations in investment levels
can be attributed to managerial eorts to manipulate current period earnings, but the evidence is
inconclusive. For instance, Roychowdhury (2006, p.335) simply claims to \nd evidence consistent
with [earning manipulation]" but does not assert that there is denitive proof. The earnings ma-
nipulation explanation is more plausible, however, when investors cannot clearly observe the rm's
investment levels. It is harder to imagine that rms can successfully deceive investors about cur-
rent period earnings by distorting investment levels when such distortions could be easily detected
through regular, audited nancial statement reporting. We contribute to this literature by testing
how decision makers behave when rms instead use these very visible investment levels as a means
to manage the signal information about their type.
2.2 Operations Management Applications of Signaling Game Theory
Operations management researchers have increasingly employed signaling game theory to study the
impact of information asymmetry across a variety of topics, including consumer purchases (Debo
and Veeraraghavan 2010), competitive entry (Anand and Goyal 2009), new product introductions
(Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997), franchising (Desai and Srinivasan 1995), channel stung (Lai
et al. 2011), supply chain coordination (Cachon and Lariviere 2001,  Ozer and Wei 2006, _ I slegen
and Plambeck 2007), and capital project and capacity investments (Lai et al. 2012). In all such
3cases, the researchers must decide how to address the multiple, and possibly innite, equilibria
that may exist in their models. These equilibrium outcomes are classied as either separating
equilibria, in which the low quality rm invests optimally and the high quality rm over-invests
in order to signal its quality, or pooling equilibria, in which low quality rms over-invest and high
quality rms under-invest so as to provide identical signals to investors (Kreps and Sobel 1992).
Cachon and Lariviere (2001),  Ozer and Wei (2006) and _ I slegen and Plambeck (2007) acknowledge
that multiple equilibria exist, but opt to focus their analyses on the least cost separating outcome
as they are particularly interested in examining situations in which the more informed player can
credibly reveal her type.
Other researchers address the issue of multiple equilibria by directly invoking the Intuitive Cri-
terion renement to rene the beliefs of the participants. Desai and Srinivasan (1995), Lariviere
and Padmanabhan (1997), Lai et al. (2011) and Lai et al. (2012) use the Intuitive Criterion rene-
ment to eliminate all possible pooling equilibrium outcomes such that only the least cost separating
equilibrium remains. More elaborate signaling games, such as those with more than one signaling
mechanism (Debo and Veeraraghavan 2010) or more than two players (Anand and Goyal 2009),
also employ the Intuitive Criterion renement, although the renement may not generate a unique
equilibria prediction in these cases. Missing from this research is a consideration of alternative
renement methods, which may yield dierent predicted outcomes if applied to these models.
The question of which renement mechanism is most appropriate remains unsettled. Banks
et al. (1994) test which renement subjects employ from a set of nested renements that use
increasingly stringent assumptions related to equilibrium dominance. They explicitly test and nd
support for the application of the Intuitive Criterion renement. Similarly, Brandts and Holt (1992,
1993) consider the predictive power of equilibrium dominance renements, including the Intuitive
Criterion. Other research explores how adaptive learning over repeat play may inuence which
equilibria subjects converge upon (Brandts and Holt 1996, Cooper et al. 1997). While nding
support for the Intuitive Criterion, they also nd that the Intuitive Criterion does not explain all
sustained equilibrium behavior. We add to this stream of research by testing the predictive power
of the Intuitive Criterion renement against that of the Undefeated renement, which has not been
experimentally tested. The Undefeated renement has gotten scant attention over the years and
4has not been employed in the operations management literature despite its apparent relevance.2
3 Theory
3.1 Model for Player Payos
The payos in our experiment are theoretically grounded on models employed in Bebchuk and Stole
(1993), Lai et al. (2012) and Schmidt et al. (2012). We apply the following set up in Section 4 to
develop scenarios for the experiment. There are two players, the rm (denoted F) and an investor
in the rm (denoted I). The rm can be one of two types with respect to its market prospects {
a \Small" opportunity type (S) or a \Big" opportunity type (B). The probability that a rm
will be type S is denoted g and type B is denoted 1   g, where g 2 [0;1]. The rm types dier
only in the probability distribution of demand. The demand distribution for a B type rst order
stochastically dominates (FOSD) the demand distribution for a S type, i.e., FS(x)  FB(x) for
all x 2 <+ and FS(x) > FB(x) for some x, where F() is the cumulative distribution function of
demand for type .
The rm must decide how many stores to open q, where q can be in multiples of a capacity
increment Q, i.e., q = nQ for some integer n. The rm's payo is a linear combination of the
investor's valuation of the rm ((q)) and the rm's expected prot ((;q)), weighted by  and
1    respectively, where  2 [0;1]:
U(;q;) = (q) + (1   )(;q): (1)
A larger value of  corresponds to a higher emphasis on short-term valuation and a correspondingly
lower emphasis on the expected long-term expected prots. The rm's expected prot is derived
by solving the newsvendor model, (;q) = E [rminfq;xg + s(q   x)+   cq] where r is the selling
price, c is the purchase cost, and s is the salvage value of unsold inventory; r > c > s.
Upon seeing the number of stores q that the rm decides to open, the investor must decide
what valuation (q) to assign to the rm. The investor can assign three values to the rm { \Big"
2Google Scholar reports that by the end of 2013 there were 230 citations to Mailath et al. (1993) (which introduced
the Undefeated renement) compared to 2,630 citations to Cho and Kreps (1987) (which introduced the Intuitive
Criterion renement). In addition, there are no citations to Mailath et al. (1993) in Management Science, Operations
Research, Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Journal, or
Journal of Operations Management.
5(which corresponds to (q) = (B;q)), \Weighted" (which corresponds to (q) = g(S;q) + (1  
g)(B;q)), or \Small" (which corresponds to (q) = (S;q)). The investor's payo depends on
being as close as possible to the true value of the rm:
V (;q;) =  [(;q)   (q)]2:
3.2 Equilibrium Renements
The equilibrium concept used in signaling games is referred to as Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE). In a PBE, neither player has an incentive to deviate from their choices, and strategies o
of the equilibrium path must be sequentially rational. For a technical denition of a PBE, refer to
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). In cases where multiple PBE exist, as reected in our experimental
scenarios, renements to the players' out-of-equilibrium (OOE) beliefs can further pare the number
of predicted PBE outcomes.
We focus on two particular renement mechanisms. The rst is the Intuitive Criterion rene-
ment, which is based on equilibrium dominance logic. We include it in our analysis because this
renement is implied by a number of other stronger renements, including Divinity, universal di-
vinity, and strategic stability (Brandts and Holt 1992, Banks et al. 1994) as well as Criterion D1
and D2 (Cho and Kreps 1987). The Intuitive Criterion renement predictions in our experiment
are also predicted by this larger set of renements, making our results more broadly generalizable.
We focus our discussion explicitly on the Intuitive Criterion renement because it is the most com-
monly applied renement approach in the literature3 and arguably the most familiar to operations
management researchers.
The second renement mechanism we test is the Undefeated renement, which is based on
Pareto optimization logic. While not widely employed in the literature, we argue that it may
be more appropriate to describe decision outcomes in operations management because it predicts
outcomes that result in a Pareto improvement in the rm's payo regardless of the rm's type, and
it can be applied in practical settings as a simple heuristic. We describe this heuristic in detail in
Section 3.2.2.
3For instance, Riley (2001) notes that the \Intuitive Criterion has dominated the literature in the years since its
introduction."
63.2.1 The Intuitive Criterion Renement
In our context, the Intuitive Criterion renement is applied by considering all possible OOE capacity
levels for a particular PBE and identifying whether, compared to the PBE results, a capacity choice
exists that would not provide a \Small" opportunity rm with a higher payo using the highest
valuation the investor could assign but would provide a \Big" opportunity rm with a higher
payo using the highest valuation the investor could assign. If such a capacity choice does exist
then the Intuitive Criterion renement eliminates the focal PBE. In signaling games involving two
players, one costly signal with continuous and innite support, two types of the informed player,
and conformance with the single crossing property, the Intuitive Criterion eliminates all but the
least cost separating PBE. For the formal denition of the Intuitive Criterion renement, please
refer to (Cho and Kreps 1987).
While it is widely applied in the literature, there are practical concerns with the Intuitive
Criterion that may make it inappropriate in some operations management settings. For instance,
the Intuitive Criterion renement asserts that decision makers will make choices that involve costly
signaling even if such choices are Pareto-dominated by alternative choices (Mailath et al. 1993), it
assumes that counterfactual information can be communicated in the game without being explicitly
modeled (Salanie 2005), and it may eliminate all choices from consideration. For an overview of
some of the criticisms of the Intuitive Criterion, refer to Mailath et al. (1993), Riley (2001), Bolton
and Dewatripont (2005), and Salanie (2005).
3.2.2 The Undefeated Renement
The Undefeated renement is based on Pareto-optimization. If there exists multiple PBE in a
game, and one of those PBE provides a Pareto improvement in payos for all types of the informed
player compared to one of the alternative PBE, then the Pareto dominated PBE is eliminated.
A PBE which is not Pareto dominated by any alternative PBE is said to be \undefeated" or to
survive the Undefeated renement. As a result, the Undefeated renement predicts the outcome
which yields the highest equilibrium payo for each type of informed player. In some cases this
may be a separating PBE and in other cases this may be a pooling PBE. For a technical denition
of the Undefeated renement, please refer to (Mailath et al. 1993). While not widely adopted,
the Undefeated renement has been applied in the nance and economics literature (Spiegel and
7Spulber 1997, Taylor 1999, Gomes 2000, Fishman and Hagerty 2003) and it addresses many of the
concerns raised about the Intuitive Criterion renement.
The Undefeated renement can also be applied as a simple heuristic, which may make it more
practically appealing in applied operations management settings. This heuristic is valid even as
the game structure gets complex. For instance, under innite types, innite strategies, and innite
state spaces, the heuristic for a given state space is the following program: (1) the highest rm type
identies her optimal capacity choice provided the investors' beliefs are unchanged (i.e. posterior
beliefs = prior beliefs), (2) the highest type compares her utility at that capacity level compared to
her utility from separating, and (3) if the highest type receives a higher utility under the capacity
level from (1), then all rm types should choose the capacity level from (1) provided it generates a
higher utility for them compared to separating. Step (1) can be done easily by, for instance, solving
a newsvendor model in the case of stochastic demand. Steps (2) and (3) can be done by solving
the utility function for each rm type at the two alternative capacity choices.
3.3 The Impact of Unit Price on Renement Compliance
Schmidt et al. (2012) show that changes in the newsvendor model parameters aect the likelihood
that a PBE exists and survives renement and the magnitude and direction of this eect depends
strongly on whether the Undefeated renement or Intuitive Criterion renement is employed. How-
ever, given that a PBE exists and survives renement, it is unclear that changes in the newsvendor
model parameters will inuence whether subjects actually make choices which conform to these
renements. There is no accommodation for such inuences on behavior in the theory for either
renement. To provide insight on this issue, we directly test whether the predictive power of each
renement varies with perturbations in the underlying newsvendor model parameters.
4 Scenario Development
Following the model described in Section 3.1, we developed a set of 4,752 scenarios for potential
inclusion in the experiment. These scenarios were generated using a manageable subset of the
parameters utilized in Schmidt et al. (2012). Specically, the rm faces a log-normal demand
distribution regardless of its type with a log-scale parameter for a S type of S = 6:0 and for a
B type of B 2 f6:25;6:50g. The shape parameter takes values 2 2 f0:15;0:25g. The unit price
8(r) ranges from 0.75 to 1.00 in increments of 0.05, unit salvage value (s) ranges from 0.0 to 0.10
in increments of 0.05, and unit cost is c = 0:4. Short-termism () ranges from 0.10 to 0.60 in
increments of 0.05, the equity holder's prior beliefs that the rm is type S (g) ranges from 0.30 to
0.40 in increments of 0.05, and the capacity investment is discrete with Q 2 f100;200g.
We then made a convenience sample of three scenarios from this set of 4,752 scenarios, and
manually conrmed that each scenario satises two conditions. First, the scenario must simultane-
ously test the predictive power of the Undefeated and Intuitive Criterion renements. To achieve
this, we use scenarios with four sequential capacity values based on the capacity increment Q. The
rst capacity choice must optimize the payo for a S type when receiving a low valuation, survive
the Intuitive Criterion renement, and be eliminated by the Undefeated renement. The second
capacity choice must optimize the payo for a B type when receiving a weighted valuation, survive
the Undefeated renement, and be eliminated by the Intuitive Criterion renement. The third
capacity choice must not be a PBE (it is necessary for inclusion due to its role in the application
of the Intuitive Criterion renement). The fourth capacity choice must be the least-cost separat-
ing capacity for a B type, survive the Intuitive Criterion renement, and be eliminated by the
Undefeated renement.
The second condition for a scenario's inclusion is that if the unit price used in the scenario is
incremented by 0.05 it yields a new scenario with four valid capacity choices. This condition allows
us to test the impact on subject behavior of changing the unit price in the newsvendor model. If
a scenario did not meet both conditions, another scenario from the pool of 4,752 scenarios was
selected and manually evaluated. This process was repeated until three scenarios meeting both
conditions were identied. By incrementing the price by 0.05 in each of these three scenarios, an
additional three scenarios were generated, for a total of six scenarios in the experiment. Table
1 summarizes the model parameters used to generate each of the six scenarios included in the
experiment.
To more realistically reect the store opening choice that is the basis of the rm's decision in
the experiment, we divided the capacity options by 100 in the scenarios. We applied a positive
linear transformation to the payos in each scenario so that the range of possible payments in each
scenarios t our budget limitations. Positive linear transformations are commonly used to represent
the same preferences as the original payo function while preserving the expected utility property
9(Mas-Colell et al. 1995).
None of the choices in any scenario are strictly dominated, so there is no guarantee that any
particular choice will result in a player realizing a higher payo. A choice is strictly dominated
for a rm type if the best utility that rm type could possibly achieve by sending that signal is
strictly lower than the worst utility that rm type could possibly achieve by sending some other
signal. A PBE has reasonable beliefs if those beliefs do not put a positive probability on any type
sending a signal that is strictly dominated. For a technical denition of Strict Dominance, refer to
(Mas-Colell et al. 1995, p.469).
Figure 1 provides the extensive form view of scenario 1, shown from the rm's perspective. The
investor's perspective was identical to that of the rm, except for minor coloration and prompt
dierences, which served to highlight each player's choice set and payos. In this scenario the rm
faced a \Big" opportunity with an ex-ante probability of 65%. A \Big" opportunity rm could
choose to open either 5, 6 or 7 stores, while a \Small" opportunity rm could choose to open
either 4, 5, or 6 stores. If the rm chooses to open a pooling quantity of either 5 or 6 stores, then
the investor is prompted to decide whether to award the rm a \Small," \Weighted," or \Big"
valuation. If instead, the rm chooses a separating quantity of 4 or 7 stores, the investor would be
notied of the quantity and informed that the rm must have been a \Small" or \Big" opportunity
rm, respectively. The players' payos for each outcome are summarized near the terminal node
for the outcome.
There are two PBE in Scenario 1, (1) the least cost separating PBE in which a \Big" type
chooses 7 stores and a \Small" type chooses 4 stores and (2) a pooling PBE in which both rm
types choose 5 stores. In the separating PBE, the \Big" type is guaranteed to earn $0.67 and the
\Small" type is guaranteed to earn $0.52. The investor earns $1.00 regardless of the rm's type.
In the pooling PBE at 5 stores, the \Big" type earns $0.84 under a \Weighted" valuation and the
\Small" type earns $0.63 under a \Weighted" valuation. The investor earns $0.9045 in expectation
by awarding a \Weighted" valuation (0:65$0:95+0:35$0:82). Opening 6 stores is not a PBE.
It is not separating PBE since a \Big" type cannot separate from a \Small" type by opening 6
stores, nor is it a pooling PBE since the \Small" type receives a higher payo by opening 4 stores
than she does by opening 6 stores and receiving a \Weighted" valuation.
The separating PBE survives the Intuitive Criterion renement since, by construction of the
10Figure 1: Extensive form of Scenario 1, with the display formatted for presentation to a rm. There is a 35%
probability that the subject in the role of the rm is randomly assigned to be a \Small" opportunity type rm.
Intuitive Criterion renement, all least cost separating PBE which are not strictly dominated
survive the Intuitive Criterion renement. The pooling PBE at 5 stores does not survive the
Intuitive Criterion renement because there exists an alternative choice (opening 6 stores), which
(1) provides the \Small" opportunity rm with a lower payo under a \Big" valuation compared
to the payo she receives under a \Weighted" valuation when opening 5 stores and (2) provides
the \Big" opportunity rm with a higher payo under a \Big" valuation compared to the payo
she receives under a \Weighted" valuation when opening 5 stores. In other words, the best payo
that a \Small" rm can get by opening 6 stores ($0.59) is less than the payo they receive under a
\Weighted" valuation when opening 5 stores ($0.63), and the best payo that a \Big" rm can get
by opening 6 stores ($0.89) is greater than the payo they receive under a \Weighted" valuation
when opening 5 stores ($0.84).
11The separating PBE does not survive the Undefeated renement since there exists an alter-
native PBE (pooling on 5 stores) which provides a higher equilibrium payo for both rm types.
Specically, the \Small" type receives a payo of $0.63 under a \Weighted" valuation when open-
ing 5 stores compared to a payo of $0.52 by opening 4 stores in the separating PBE. The \Big"
type receives a payo of $0.84 under a \Weighted" valuation when opening 5 stores compared to
a payo of $0.67 by opening 7 stores in the separating PBE. The pooling PBE at 5 stores survives
the Undefeated renement since there does not exist an alternative PBE which provides a higher
equilibrium payo for both rm types.
Figure 2 provides the extensive form view of Scenario 2 from the investor's perspective. Note
that the structure of this scenario is similar to that of Scenario 1, although with dierent payos. In
this case, the payos are determined by increasing the unit price by 6.67% (from 0.75 to 0.80) in the
underlying newsvendor model used to generate the player payos. Figures 4 and 5 in the Appendix
provide the extensive forms for the remaining 4 scenarios. Scenario 4 is similar to Scenario 3 except
that the unit price is increased by 6.67% (from 0.75 to 0.80) in the underlying newsvendor model.
Scenario 6 is similar to Scenario 5 except that the unit price is increased by 5.88% (from 0.85
to 0.90) in the underlying newsvendor model. This design facilitates our analysis by enabling us
to examine whether participants acted consistently across scenario pairs. Table 2 identies the




Participants. Participants (N=228, Median age=25, 48% female) completed this experiment in
a behavioral laboratory at a university on the American East Coast in exchange for $15.00 plus
an average bonus of $10.37, which was based on the outcomes of their decisions. The participants
belonged to a subject pool associated with the university's business school, and registered for
the study in response to an online posting. Roughly two-thirds of the participants were full-time
undergraduate or graduate students hailing from a wide array of elds. The remaining participants
were residents who lived in the surrounding community.
12Figure 2: Extensive form of Scenario 2, with the display formatted for presentation to an investor. There is a
35% probability that the subject in the role of the rm is randomly assigned to be a \Small" opportunity type
rm.
Experimental design and procedure. At the beginning of the session, a monitor read a
script aloud to familiarize the subjects with their roles and the experimental procedure. The text of
the script is provided in the Appendix, and the accompanying presentation slides are available from
the authors upon request. Throughout the session, subjects engaged with one another anonymously,
through a web-based software application that was developed for this experiment. The software
restricted communication between subjects explicitly to the decisions described below. Subjects
were not permitted to engage with one another outside of the software.
Subjects considered each of the six scenarios from both the perspectives of a rm and an investor,
resulting in a total of 12 rounds. At the beginning of each round, subjects were randomly and
anonymously paired with one another and notied of their role for the round (rm or investor).
13Next, the matched pair of subjects was presented with the extensive form view of a randomly
selected scenario and the probability the rm faced a \Big" opportunity. Upon seeing the extensive
form representation, subjects were asked to anticipate the choices they would make under dierent
realizations of the scenario. Subjects playing the role of the rm were asked how many stores they
would open if they faced a \Big" or \Small" opportunity. The quantity choices available to the
rm represented dierent combinations of separating PBE, pooling PBE, and choices that were not
PBE. Concurrently, subjects playing the role of the investor were asked whether they would award
a \Big," \Weighted," or \Small" valuation to the rm, if they observed the rm select each of the
pooling quantities under its consideration.
We elicited strategies from subjects prior to capturing their direct responses during actual
game play for two reasons. First, by asking the subjects to predene their strategies, we hoped to
encourage them to consider each scenario from dierent perspectives before committing to a nal
decision. Second, by engaging in this staged approach, we were able to control for whether rms
and investors deviated from their original strategies once information had been revealed to them.4
Next, based on the stated probability, the software designated the rm to be facing a \Big"
or \Small" opportunity, revealing this information only to the subject playing the role of the rm.
Upon receiving this private information, the subject playing the role of the rm could conrm or
revise the number of stores she chose to open. Then, the number of stores opened by the rm (but
not its type) was revealed to the investor, who could in turn, conrm or revise her valuation.
At the end of each round, the payo received by the rm depended on the rm's type and store
quantity, as well as the valuation chosen by the investor. The payo for the investor depended on
their choice being as close as possible to the rm's actual type. To remove the potential confound
of order eects, we counterbalanced the presentation order of scenarios. However, we also wished to
facilitate a deep understanding of the game among the subjects. To that end, subjects completed a
scenario in one role (rm or investor) and then completed the same scenario in the other role before
4A strength of the strategy method is that it may lead subjects to make more thoughtful decisions by encouraging
them to think through multiple possibilities (Brandts and Charness 2011), but critics argue that having to submit
entire strategies forces subjects to think about each information set in a dierent way than if they could primarily
concentrate on those information sets that arise in the course of the game (Roth 1995). Hence, we leverage the
strategy method to help subjects fully consider each scenario, but we perform our analyses on direct response data
captured during actual game play.
14moving on to a new scenario. Finally, we sought to mitigate the eects of retaliation from past
rounds by pairing subjects with new, anonymous, and randomly-selected partners at the beginning
of each round.
5.2 Measures
Table 3 summarizes the variables used in our analysis, Table 4 provides summary statistics and
correlations, and Table 5 summarizes the categorical variables by subject.
5.2.1 Dependent Variables
We utilize three dependent variables in our analysis. We employ two dichotomous variables, Un-
defeated and Intuitive, to analyze whether subjects make choices consistent with the Undefeated
or Intuitive Criterion renement. Undefeated is set to `1' if the rm's choice conforms to the Un-
defeated renement, and `0' if it does not. Intuitive is set to `1' if the rm's choice conforms to
the Intuitive Criterion renement, and `0' if it does not. We utilize a continuous variable, Payo,
to analyze whether rms make more money when their choice conforms to either renement. This
variable captures the payo the subject receives in each round regardless of whether this amount
is included in the subject's bonus.
5.2.2 Independent Variables
In practical settings, decision makers are apt to possess a sound understanding of the implications
of their decisions. This is reected in economic models that examine such decisions, which often
assume that decision makers behave rationally in assessing the repercussions of their choices.5 To
analyze whether the subject's level of understanding of the decision setting is associated with her
making choices that are predicted by either the Undefeated or Intuitive Criterion renements, we
use a dichotomous variable, Understanding. Each subject assessed their level of understanding by
responding to a post-experiment survey, which asked \On a scale of 1-7 (1: `I did not understand
the game at all', 7: `I understood the game completely') how well do you feel you understood the
5We implemented several features in our experimental design to foster a better understanding of the game among
the subjects, including asking subjects to enter their strategies before each round of play, having subjects switch roles
and play the game both as a rm and an investor, and playing multiple rounds.
15game we just played?" Based on these responses we set Understanding to `1' if the subject rated
their understanding as a `5' or higher and `0' if they rated it a `4' or lower. We encode subjects that
did not respond to this question as a `0', but isolate this eect using the variable Understanding -
No Response which is set to `1' if the subject did not respond and `0' otherwise.
Subjects generally indicated a high level of understanding of the game { 86.3% of subjects
responded with a 5, 6 or 7 and the mean response was 5.89. As a consequence, some of the
response categories are so sparsely populated that we cannot use the full 7-point scale in our
analysis. We do, however, run robustness tests using more granular measures of understanding
than the dichotomous measure we use to present our main results. Our ndings are unchanged
with these alternative measures of understanding.
Undefeated and Intuitive, as described in Section 5.2.1, serve as the key independent variables
in our analysis of whether the rm's payo is impacted by making choices which conform to either
the Undefeated or Intuitive Criterion renements.
5.2.3 Control Variables
We collect several variables in each round of the experiment to track information related to the set
up and play of the game. Big is set to `1' to identify those subjects that are randomly assigned to
have a \Big" opportunity in the current round. Switch identies whether the subject's nal choice
deviated from the initial strategy they entered prior to learning their type. Session identies the
experimental session in which the subject participated. Sequence reects the order in which a
scenario is presented to a subject and captures changes in behavior as subjects see more scenarios.
We also include demographic information on the subjects. Age is the age of the subject at the
time of the experiment. Female identies the subject's gender. Ethnicity reects the subject's self-
aliated ethnicity. Education is a categorical variable capturing the most recent level of education
attained by the subject. ESL reects whether the subject considers English to be their second
language. The categories used for the categorical variables are presented in Table 3.
5.3 Empirical Models
Our primary analyses evaluate (1) the consistency of subjects' decisions with the predictions of
the Intuitive Criterion and Undefeated renements and (2) whether changing the unit price in the
16underlying model impacts subject behavior. We expand our analysis by also evaluating (3) whether
the participant's level of understanding of the game and the complexity of the game inuence the
predictive power of each renement and (4) whether behavior consistent with each renement has
an impact on payos. We evaluate the rst two research questions using two-sided binomial tests.
The empirical models we use to analyze the latter two questions are described below.
5.3.1 Impact of Understanding on Renement Predictions
We are interested in the relationship between each subject's self-reported level of understanding of
the game and the likelihood that their decisions are predicted by either the Undefeated renement
or the Intuitive Criterion renement. Any predictive power associated with the renements could
justiably be called into question if subjects report having a low understanding of the game. Indeed,
we expect that in most managerial contexts, decision makers have a high level of understanding
with regard to their choices and their potential implications. As such, we are particularly interested
in which renement mechanism best predicts the behavior of decision makers with a high level of
understanding. We examine this relationship for the Undefeated renement by estimating the
following logistic model, with robust standard errors clustered by participant:
Pr(Undefeatedij) = F(0 + 1  Understandingi + 2  Understanding - No Responsei+
3  Bigij + 4  Switchij + 0Xi + ij);
(2)
where subscript i denotes the subject and j denotes the round. The function F() refers to the
logistic function. To examine this relationship for the Intuitive Criterion renement, Intuitive is
used as the dependent variable in place of Undefeated. The vector Xi includes control variables:
Session, Sequence, Age, Female, Ethnicity, Education, and ESL. We include Session to account for
any structural issues that are constant within a session (instruction errors, for instance). Sequence
controls for the possibility that a learning eect may be driving our result. We include Age and
Education to account for dierences in aptitude or experience across the subjects. Finally, Female,
Ethnicity, and ESL control for any dierences that may be associated with gender or ethnicity.
5.3.2 Impact of Behavior on Payos
To evaluate whether subjects who make choices that are consistent with the Undefeated rene-
ment or the Intuitive Criterion renement earn a higher payo, we estimate the following OLS
17specication, which we estimate with robust standard errors clustered by participant:
Payo ij =0 + 1  Undefeatedij + 2  Intuitiveij + 3  Understandingi+
4  Understanding - No Responsei + 5  Bigij + 6  Switchij+
0Xi + ij:
(3)
where Payo is the payo for the subject in each round. The other variables and vector of controls
are as described for Equation (2). By comparing the payos earned by rms exhibiting behavior
consistent with each renement, we are able to investigate which set of strategies is more rational for
the prot maximizing rm. To the extent that behavior associated with one renement methodology
is more protable in our experimental market than behavior consistent with the other, we would
assert that an actual rm, helmed by actual decision makers, may have incentives to exhibit such
behavior in practice.
6 Results
6.1 Predictive Power of Intuitive Criterion and Undefeated Renements
Table 6 presents the degree to which subjects' decisions conformed to the predictions of the Un-
defeated and Intuitive Criterion renements in each experimental scenario. In our experiment, the
majority of subjects' decisions followed the predictions of the Undefeated renement. Its predictive
power across scenarios ranged from a low of 55.7% accuracy for Scenario 4 to a high of 71.1%
accuracy for both Scenarios 1 and 5. Subjects' decisions matched the predictions of the Intuitive
Criterion on far fewer occasions. Its predictive power across scenarios ranged from a low of 17.1%
accuracy for Scenarios 1 and 3 to a high of 29.4% accuracy for Scenario 2.
We test whether the predictive power of each renement is statistically signicant using two-
sided binomial tests of the null hypothesis that each renement has no predictive power. If the
conformance of subjects' decisions to the predictions of each renement were the product of random
chance, then we would expect to see decisions conform to the renement predictions one third of
the time since each scenario has three choices. The tests evaluate the degree to which choices
deviate from these expectations. We evaluate the predictive power of each renement in each
scenario individually and then in aggregate. Subjects' decisions conformed to the predictions of
the Undefeated renement in all six scenarios (p <0.001 two-sided for each scenario). Aggregating
18across all scenarios, we found support for the predictive power of the Undefeated renement, which
predicted 63.5% of subjects' decisions (p < 0:001; two-sided), relative to an expectation of 33.3%
if it instead had no predictive power.6
In contrast, subjects' decisions were not predicted by the Intuitive Criterion renement. In ve
of the six scenarios, subjects made choices which conformed with the Intuitive Criterion renement
less often than what would be expected if subjects were simply making random selections (p <0.05
two-sided, for Scenario 4, and p <0.001 two-sided for Scenarios 1, 3, 5 and 6). The sole exception
is Scenario 2 in which 29.4% (p = 0:23; two-sided) of subject responses conformed to the Intuitive
Criterion renement, which is statistically indistinguishable from an expectation of 33.3%. Across
all scenarios combined, we nd support that the Intuitive Criterion renement, which predicted
20.9% of subjects' decisions (p <0.001 two-sided), has less predictive power than an expectation of
33.3% if subject choices were purely random.7
To test which renement is more predictive, we perform a two-sided binomial test of the null
hypothesis that there is no dierence in the predictive power of the two renements. We discard 212
out of 1,368 observations in which subjects made decisions that were not predicted by either rene-
ment, leaving 1,156 observations. If neither renement were predictive, then we would expect to see
subjects splitting their decisions evenly between the options. However, 869 of 1,156 choices (75.2%)
conformed to the Undefeated renement, while the remaining 287 choices (24.8%) conformed to
the Intuitive Criterion renement. Results of the binomial tests reject the null hypothesis in favor
of the alternative that the Undefeated renement is more predictive than the Intuitive Criterion
renement (p < 0:001; two-sided).
6.2 Sensitivity to Newsvendor Unit Price
As described in Section 4, Scenarios 1 and 2 are the same in all respects except the unit price
used to determine the players' payos is 6.67% higher in Scenario 2. The unit price has also been
6As a robustness test, we also considered just the rst scenario seen by each subject. Since scenarios are randomly
assigned, dierent scenarios will be presented rst to dierent subjects. We nd strong support for the predictive
power of the Undefeated renement, which predicted 56.1% of subjects' decisions (p<0.001; two-sided), relative to an
expectation of 33.3%.
7We again considered just the rst scenario seen by each subject and nd that rms made choices which conformed
with the Intuitive Criterion renement 24.6% of the time (p<0.01 two-sided), far less often than what would be expected
if subjects were simply making random selections.
19increased in Scenario 4 relative to Scenario 3 and in Scenario 6 relative to Scenario 5. We use
two-sided binomial tests to determine whether subject behavior diers across these scenario pairs.
Rows 2 and 4 of Table 6 summarize these results.
As shown in Table 6, conformance with the Undefeated renement is higher in Scenarios 1, 3, and
5 than in Scenarios 2, 4 and 6. The dierence in the proportion of subjects whose behavior conforms
with the Undefeated renement between Scenarios 1 and 2 (di = 0.114, p <0.05 two-sided),
Scenarios 3 and 4 (di = 0.075, p =0.11 two-sided), and Scenarios 5 and 6 (di = 0.105, p <0.05
two-sided), are all positive and the rst and third dierences are statistically signicant. Comparing
all odd scenarios to all even scenarios, the dierence is positive and statistically signicant (di
= 0.098, p <0.001 two-sided). Conformance with the Intuitive Criterion renement is lower in
Scenarios 1, 3, and 5 than in Scenarios 2, 4 and 6. The dierence in the proportion of subjects
whose behavior conforms with the Intuitive Criterion renement between Scenarios 1 and 2 (di
= -0.123, p <0.01 two-sided), Scenarios 3 and 4 (di = -0.088, p <0.05 two-sided), and Scenarios
5 and 6 (di = -0.048, p =0.18 two-sided), are all negative and the rst and second dierences are
statistically signicant. Comparing all odd scenarios to all even scenarios, the dierence is negative
and statistically signicant (di = -0.086, p <0.001 two-sided).
To understand these results, recall from Section 3.2 that the Undefeated renement predicts
the outcome (either a separating PBE or a pooling PBE) which provides the highest equilibrium
payo to both rm types. As the dierential payo between the PBE alternatives is reduced,
subjects will become indierent between them. In our scenarios, an increase in unit price reduces
the proportional improvement of the pooling PBE payo relative to the separating PBE payo for
\Big" opportunity rms while leaving the proportional payos largely unchanged for the \Small"
opportunity rms. For instance, in Scenario 1 the equilibrium payo for the \Big" opportunity rm
that chooses a pooling PBE at 5 stores is 25% higher than the payo received by separating ($0.84
versus $0.67). The increase in unit price in Scenario 2 reduces this improvement in the equilibrium
payo to 11% ($1.15 versus $1.04).8 The change in relative payos between scenarios is much less
pronounced for the \Small" opportunity rms, which receive a 21% higher payo in the pooling
8The pattern of a material reduction in the proportional improvement in the \Big" opportunity rm's payos
from the pooling PBE compared to the separating PBE is also present between Scenarios 3 (24% improvement) and
4 (12% improvement) and between Scenarios 5 (16% improvement) and 6 (6% improvement).
20PBE in Scenario 1 ($0.63 versus $0.52) and a 19% higher payo in Scenario 2 ($0.92 versus $0.77).9
Using this rationale, we expect to see a smaller proportion of \Big" opportunity rms comply
with the Undefeated renement in Scenario 2 compared to Scenario 1, and approximately the
same proportion of \Small" opportunity rms. As summarized in Table 7, our results conrm
this intuition. The proportion of \Big" opportunity rms exhibiting behavior that complies with
the Undefeated renement is 19.3 percentage points lower in Scenario 2 compared to Scenario 1
(p <0.001 two-sided) while the proportion of \Small" opportunity rms exhibiting behavior that
complies with the Undefeated renement is 0.9 percentage points lower in Scenario 2 compared to
Scenario 1 (p =0.90 two-sided). Table 7 shows similar results comparing Scenario 3 to Scenario 4
and Scenario 5 to Scenario 6.
These ndings support the underlying logic behind the Undefeated renement that rms make
choices based on the Pareto improvement in equilibrium outcomes. As the improvement in equi-
librium payos between a pooling PBE and a separating PBE increases (diminishes), the pooling
PBE becomes more (less) attractive to decision makers. The relationships between the model pa-
rameters and payos can be complex in a discrete capacity model such as ours, and these results
show that the predictive power of renements is sensitive to changes in the model parameters used
to generate the payos. This is an important as it highlights that model parameters can inuence
whether subjects conform to dierent renement theories beyond simply determining whether an
equilibrium outcome exists and survives a particular renement.10
6.3 Impact of Understanding on Renement Predictions
Table 8 presents the results of our estimation of Equation 2, which tests whether the subject's level
of understanding of the game is related to making choices which are predicted by either renement.
Model (1) tests for consistency with the Undefeated renement's predictions and Model (2) tests for
9There is also a much more muted change in the proportional improvement in the \Small" opportunity rm's
payos from the pooling PBE compared to the separating PBE between Scenarios 3 (10% improvement) and 4 (14%
improvement) and between Scenarios 5 (24% improvement) and 6 (20% improvement).
10It is interesting to note that the Undefeated renement has signicant predictive power even when the improve-
ment in the equilibrium payout is quite small. For instance, in Scenario 6 a \Big" opportunity rm's equilibrium
payo from the pooling PBE ($0.93) is only 6% higher than that from the separating PBE ($0.88), and yet 53.8% of
\Big" opportunity rms comply with the Undefeated renement prediction, signicantly more (p <0.001 two-sided)
than the 33.3% expected from random choice.
21consistency with the Intuitive Criterion renement's predictions. As shown in Model (1) of Table
8, subjects reporting a high level of understanding of the game were more likely to make choices
consistent with the Undefeated renement than subjects reporting a low level of understanding of
the game (coe 0.68, p < 0:05, odds ratio [OR] = 1.97). This eect corresponds to a 0.66 predicted
probability of making a choice consistent with the Undefeated renement for subjects with a high
self-reported understanding of the game (Understanding = \1") versus 0.51 for subjects with a
low self-reported understanding of the game (Understanding = \0").11 From Model (2), subjects
reporting a high level of understanding of the game were less likely to make choices consistent with
the Intuitive Criterion renement than subjects reporting a low level of understanding of the game
(coe -0.91, p < 0:001, OR = 0.40). This eect corresponds to a 0.19 predicted probability of
making a choice consistent with the Intuitive Criterion renement for subjects with a high self-
reported understanding of the game (Understanding = \1") versus 0.35 for subjects with a low
self-reported understanding of the game (Understanding = \0"). We compare the coecients on
Understanding between Models (1) and (2) and nd that the dierence is signicant (Wald 2 22.46,
p < 0:001), underscoring that subjects with a higher understanding of the game were more likely to
make choices predicted by the Undefeated renement than by the Intuitive Criterion renement.12
6.4 Impact of Behavior on Payos
Table 9 presents the OLS estimation of Equation 3 specifying the relationship between the subjects'
payos and whether their choices were consistent with either the Intuitive Criterion or Undefeated
renements. Model (1) includes both Undefeated and Intuitive in the specication while Models (2)
and (3) examine them separately. We estimate each model using OLS with robust standard errors
clustered by subject. In model (1), the coecient on Undefeated is positive and signicant (coe
0.04, SE 0.01, p < 0:01) and the coecient on Intuitive is negative and signicant (coe -0.05, SE
0.01, p < 0:001). A Wald test comparing these coecients provides evidence that subjects who
make choices that are predicted by the Undefeated renement receive a higher payo than those
making choices predicted by the Intuitive Criterion renement (dierence 0.088, Wald 2 67.37,
p < 0:001). This $0.088 dierence is economically material, representing an average 11.3% increase
11This is the average marginal eect (AME) of Understanding over all observations.
12As a robustness check, we consider more granular categorizations to measure subject understanding and all of
our inferences remain the same.
22in the payo earned by subjects when their choice is consistent with the Undefeated renement
rather than the Intuitive Criterion renement. Recall that none of the choices available to the rm
in any round are dominated by any other choice, so the rm is not guaranteed to make more money
by making choices that conform to any particular renement. Instead, the payos earned by the
rm are in part determined by the actions, and hence the beliefs, of the investors in each round
of the game. A higher payo implies that investors are awarding higher valuations to rms when
their choices are consistent with the Undefeated renement.
Model (2) shows that subjects who made choices that were predicted by the Undefeated rene-
ment earned a higher payo (coe 0.07, SE 0.01, p < 0:001), earning on average $0.07 more in each
round than subjects who made alternative choices. This corresponds to an average 8.4% increase
in the payo earned by subjects when their choice is consistent with the Undefeated renement.
Finally, Model (3) dichotomizes the subjects' choices into those that are predicted by the Intuitive
Criterion and those that are not, and shows that subjects who made choices that were predicted by
the Intuitive Criterion renement earned a lower payo than those who made alternative choices
(coe -0.08, SE 0.01, p < 0:001). This corresponds to an average 9.1% decrease in the payo earned
by subjects when their choice is consistent with the Intuitive Criterion renement.
7 Applications of the Undefeated Renement
Signaling game theory has been used to analyze how parties will behave in the face of information
asymmetry in a variety of settings relevant to operations management. Existing research has
focused on the least cost separating PBE outcomes, either by assumption or as a result of applying
the Intuitive Criterion renement. In this section, we consider how the results of such research can
be extended by considering pooling PBE which may exist and survive the Undefeated renement.
As an example, we examine the implications for Cachon and Lariviere (2001), the most widely cited
signaling game paper in the operations management literature.
7.1 Supply Chain Coordination in Cachon and Lariviere (2001)
Cachon and Lariviere (2001) evaluate demand forecast sharing between a manufacturer (she/her)
and a supplier (he/his). The authors analyze the impact of asymmetric information between the
manufacturer and supplier and identify how the manufacturer can develop contract terms that
23signal her private demand information to the supplier. There are two compliance regimes in the
paper. In the forced compliance regime the supplier is obligated to build the capacity level dictated
by the manufacturer. In this case, the high type manufacturer can signal for free and retains all
of the supply chain prots. We focus our discussion on the voluntary compliance regime as this is
the case in which the manufacturer faces a signaling problem and must employ a costly signal to
convince the supplier to build the desired capacity.
Cachon and Lariviere focus on the separating equilibrium, but acknowledge that \there might
exist one or more pooling equilibria in which the supplier assumes that both [manufacturer] types
oer the same terms" (Cachon and Lariviere 2001, p.642). Noting that the analysis of such equilibria
is complex, the authors \defer the analysis of pooling equilibria to future research." We apply the
Undefeated renement to highlight how the analysis in this paper can be extended to include
pooling equilibria, as envisioned by the authors. Using the Undefeated renement provides three
incremental benets. First, it provides a tractable analytical framework for an otherwise complex
problem. Second, it allows for the identication of conditions under which the dierent equilibrium
outcomes (pooling versus separating) are expected. Third, it enables an analysis of the behavior
of the players under these dierent equilibrium outcomes.
We adopt the authors' notation and summarize important aspects of the model here, thought the
reader should refer to Cachon and Lariviere (2001) for details. The manufacturer faces stochastic
demand and knows some parameter  of its demand distribution such that D = X, where X is a
random variable with cumulative distribution function F and  2 fL;Hg with F(xjL) > F(xjH) for
x > 0 and F(0jL)  F(xjH). The supplier is unaware of the manufacturer's  due to information
asymmetry, but everything else in the model is common knowledge. The expected sales given an
available capacity K is S(K) = K  
K R
0
F(x)dx. It costs the supplier cK > 0 to install one unit of
capacity and cp > 0 to produce one component for the manufacturer. The manufacturer includes
the supplier's component in her nished product, which she sells for r > cK + cp per unit.
The sequence of events is as follows. The manufacturer learns her demand distribution D and
the supplier learns the probability  2 (0;1) that the true demand distribution follows DH and
1  that it follows DL. The manufacturer oers a contract to the supplier to induce him to build
capacity K. The supplier accepts the contract if it provides him with an expected prot greater
than zero. Upon acceptance, the supplier decides how much capacity to build. Demand is then
24realized and prots are earned.
The contract oered by the manufacturer may include both rm commitments and options,
where m  0 is the number of rm commitments and o  0 is the number of options. The supplier
is paid wm per rm commitment, wo per option, and we per option exercised and delivered. For
notational convenience, Cachon and Lariviere (2001) use w in place of we to reect dierent
wholesale prices oered by the two manufacturer types, where w(K) = cK
F
+ cp.
The manufacturer's prots depend on her type, the contract terms, the amount of capacity,
and the supplier's beliefs about her type. K
H (K
L) denotes that capacity which maximizes the
high (low) type manufacturer's expected prots when there is no information asymmetry. Under
information asymmetry, the expected prot using a wholesale price-only contract for a type 
manufacturer if the supplier believes the manufacturer is type  2 fL;Hg is:
(K;) = (r   w(K))S(K): (4)
The authors show that the high type manufacturer has multiple contract alternatives to credibly
reveal her type to the supplier, all of which yield a separating PBE. One option is to purchase
K
H options at a price of wo = A=K
H, where A is eectively a lump sum paid to the supplier,
A = L(K
H;H)   L(K
L;L). Another option, which produces a higher expected prot for the
high type, is to signal with the wholesale price by requesting K > K
H and oering a smaller lump
sum. Finally, the authors point out that rm commitments are more eective than a lump sum
payment. In this case, when a type  manufacturer who the supplier believes to be type H pays a
lump sum A and buys m rm commitments at wm = WH(K), the expected prot is:
(K;m;A) = rS(K)   wH(K)(S(K)   S(m) + m)   A;m  mH(K): (5)
where mH(K) is an upper bound on m necessary to ensure the supplier builds some capacity.
7.2 Allowing for Pooling PBE
We generalize these results to account for a pooling PBE that survives the Undefeated renement.
In many cases, there will exist multiple pooling PBE that provide both types of manufacturer a
higher payo than is realized under the separating PBE. For ease of exposition, we focus on the
unique pooling PBE that is a lexicographically maximum sequential equilibrium (LMSE). According
to Mailath et al. (1993), a PBE is a LMSE if among all PBE it maximizes the utility for a high
25type, and conditional on maximizing the utility for a high type, it then maximizes the utility for a
low type. Using a LMSE to identify a unique PBE is intuitively appealing because typically a low
type manufacturer wishes to be perceived as a high type manufacturer rather than the opposite.
We utilize some additional notation to present these results. Let  denote the posterior proba-
bility that the manufacturer is a high type and 1   denote the posterior probability that she is a
low type. Let FP = FH+(1 )FL denote the supplier's perception of the cumulative distribution
function for demand when the supplier is unaware of the manufacturer's type. In a pooling PBE
 =  and both manufacturer types oer the same contract terms. Finally, let KP be the capacity
investment that maximizes the expected utility of a high type in a pooling PBE, i.e.,
KP = argmax
K
H(K;m;A) : ( = ): (6)
We consider pooling PBE in which both manufacturer types oer the same wholesale price-only
contract and compare this to separating PBE alternatives in which the manufacturer is free to use
some combination of pricing, rm commitments and lump sum payments. This is conservative as
additional pooling PBE may exist in which both manufacturer types oer the same combination of
pricing, rm commitments and lump sum payments. We leave this extension to future research. To
account for the fact that in a pooling PBE the supplier does not know the rm's type, we modify
Equation (4) to:
(K;) = (r   w(K))S(K); (7)
where w(K) = cK
FP + cp. Note that when  = 1, we recover Equation (4) for  = H, and when
 = 0 we recover Equation (4) for  = L.
A pooling PBE will exist in which the manufacturer, regardless of her type, chooses capacity
KP and oers w, provided H(K;) > max
K;m;a
H(K;m;A) and L(K;) > L(K
L;L). These
conditions are also sucient for the pooling PBE at KP to survive the Undefeated renement. The
intuition behind this result is that both types will pool at KP if doing so yields a strictly higher
expected prot than could otherwise be achieved under the best possible separating PBE outcome.
7.3 Example
We use the example in Section 5.4 of Cachon and Lariviere (2001) to demonstrate that a pooling
PBE will provide a superior return for both manufacturer types (and therefore survive the Un-
defeated renement) compared to the best separating PBE alternative. In this example, demand
26is exponentially distributed with mean H = 10 for the high type manufacturer and L = 5 for
the low type, r = 1, cK = 0:1 and cp = 0:1. Figure 3a identies the manufacturer's prot curves
and corresponds to Figure 1 in Cachon and Lariviere (2001). The main ndings from the original
example are that a high type manufacturer can separate either by using a wholesale price-only
contract at K
H and paying a lump sum A1 = 0:67, oering K3 and a lump sum A2 = 0:43, or
oering K4 and rm commitments of m = 2:65. The high type receives the highest expected prot
of 3.65 under last option while the low type receives an expected prot of 2.00 under each option.
Figure 3b introduces the expected prot curves for both manufacturer types under a pooling
PBE using Equation (7) for  = . The expected prot for the high type at KP is 3.86 (labeled as
Point A in the gure), which represents an improvement of 6% compared to the high type's best
separating PBE outcome of 3.65 in Cachon and Lariviere (2001) (labeled as Point B). The expected
prot for the low type at KP is 2.61 (labeled as Point C), which represents a 30% improvement
compared to the low type's separating PBE outcome of 2.00 in Cachon and Lariviere (2001) (labeled
as Point D). The pooling PBE at KP oers materially higher expected prots for the manufacturer
regardless of her type. This outcome also has implications for the supplier and the supply chain. The
supplier's expected prots are reduced by 0.30 compared to the best separating outcome identied
in Cachon and Lariviere (2001). This reduction in expected supplier prots in the pooling outcome
is primarily because the high type manufacturer no longer pays a rm commitment to the supplier
to reserve potentially unneeded capacity. The net eect is that the total expected supply chain
prots increase by 0.08, or 1.7
In our example we assumed  = 0:10, but the pooling PBE outcome is not idiosyncratic to
this particular value of . Both types will achieve a higher expected prot from pooling for any
 2 (0;0:25).
7.4 Applications to Other Research
We note that the results of other research streams can be extended by explicitly considering pooling
outcomes through the application of the Undefeated renement. These research streams include
supply chain coordination and contracting ( Ozer and Wei 2006, Lai et al. 2012), franchising deci-
sions (Desai and Srinivasan 1995), channel stung (Lai et al. 2011), and market encroachment by
suppliers (Li et al. 2013). The outcome examined in each of these papers is the least cost separating
27Figure 3: Manufacturer's Prot as a Function of Capacity with Exponential Demand Under Voluntary Com-
pliance.
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PBE. In each case, however, a pooling PBE exists and survives the Undefeated renement across
some set of model parameters. We leave a detailed analysis of the implications of applying the
Undefeated renement in these settings to future research.
8 Implications and Conclusions
While decision making under information asymmetry is a burgeoning eld within operations man-
agement, little has been done to reconcile the behavior of actual decision makers with the as-
sumptions that underlie models in this area. The primary contribution of this paper is to provide
empirical evidence that characterizes the types of decisions made by actors in these contexts. In
our experiment, pooling behaviors, which are not regularly considered in the extant theory, were
widespread among subjects, relative to separating behaviors. In particular, averaged across all
scenarios, subject behavior was more than three times more likely to conform with the Undefeated
renement than the Intuitive Criterion renement, which to date has been the predominant belief
renement used in the operations management literature. These results can inform the develop-
ment of operations management theory, as well as help practitioners interpret the implications of
28models that emerge from our eld.
We observe several patterns in our data that provide condence that the conformance with
the Undefeated renement that we observe in the laboratory may extend to the decision-making
behavior of real managers. First, we expect that prudent managers would make deliberate de-
cisions in practice, paying attention to changing dynamics and responding rationally to changes
in the underlying payo structure. We observe such behavior in our experiment, which suggests
that subjects were paying attention to the stimuli and being thoughtful about their decisions. Sec-
ond, in practice, we expect actual decision makers to possess a deep understanding of the decision
space and the implications of their decisions. We observe that subjects who report a high level
of understanding of the game are signicantly more likely to exhibit behaviors that are consistent
with the Undefeated renement than subjects who report a low level of understanding. Third,
we expect managers to use strategies that generate higher payos. In our experiment, subjects
who exhibited behavior that was consistent with the Undefeated renement earned higher pay-
os from investors on average than subjects who exhibited behavior consistent with the Intuitive
Criterion renement. This is particularly interesting in the context of our experiment, in which
subjects engaged in decisions from both the investor and rm perspectives and were exposed to the
full set of incentives aorded to both sides. Finally, we would expect that over time, experienced
managers will increasingly gravitate toward the strategy that returns the highest payo. Indeed,
in our experiment, while subject behavior overwhelmingly conformed with the predictions of the
Undefeated renement, even during the rst rounds of game play, the tendency to exhibit such be-
havior intensied as subjects experienced more rounds of the game. As the order in which scenarios
were presented was counterbalanced across sessions, the pattern of these results is consistent with
subjects learning the ecacy of various strategies and converging on the most successful one over
time. All of these patterns observed among the subjects in our experiment are consistent with the
behavior of managers in practice, which increases our condence about the generalizability of our
results.
Managers are constantly operating under conditions of information asymmetry. The decisions
they make can send signals about their rms' prospects to less-informed parties in a broad array of
contexts. From a manager evaluating the viability of a potential supply chain partner, to a customer
evaluating a rm's ability to meet her needs, to an analyst providing guidance on a rm's future
29stock performance, the signals rms send through their actions can materially inuence how they are
perceived and engaged by less-informed parties, with important implications for both sides. Hence,
we expect this growing area of operations management research to continue to ourish. To the
extent our results expand the set of anticipated managerial behaviors in these contexts, exploring
their operational implications through the application of the Undefeated renement may enrich
the extant theory. Opportunities may exist to revisit established models, as well as explore the
implications of these behaviors in new settings. Empirical research that explores these behaviors
and their implications in practice is another promising future direction that we leave to future
research.
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33Table 1: The model parameters used to generate the six scenarios in the experiment.
Scenario S B 2 r s c  g Q
1 6.0 6.25 0.15 0.75 0.05 0.40 0.60 0.35 100
2 6.0 6.25 0.15 0.80 0.05 0.40 0.60 0.35 100
3 6.0 6.50 0.15 0.75 0.05 0.40 0.60 0.35 200
4 6.0 6.50 0.15 0.80 0.05 0.40 0.60 0.35 200
5 6.0 6.25 0.15 0.85 0.00 0.40 0.55 0.35 100
6 6.0 6.25 0.15 0.90 0.00 0.40 0.55 0.35 100
Table 2: Summary of the Undefeated renement and Intuitive Criterion renement predictions for each scenario.
Scenario:
1 2 3 4 5 6
Undefeated Pool on 5 Pool on 5 Pool on 6 Pool on 6 Pool on 5 Pool on 5
Intuitive Criterion Separating Separating Separating Separating Separating Separating
34Table 3: Description of Variables
Variable Description
Undefeated Indicator variable identifying whether the Undefeated re-
nement predicts the rm's choice (`1') or not (`0')
Intuitive Indicator variable identifying whether the Intuitive Crite-
rion renement predicts the rm's choice (`1') or not (`0')
Payo Payo (in dollars) the subject received in the round
Understanding Indicator variable identifying whether the subject rated
their understanding as a `5' or higher (`1'), or a `4' or lower
(`0') on a 7-point Likert scale where `1' indicates \I did not
understand the game at all" and `7' indicates \I understood
the game completely"
Understanding - No Response Indicator variable identifying whether the subject rated
their understanding (`1') or not (`0')
Big Indicator variable identifying whether the subject is a Big
type in current round (`1') or a Small type (`0')
Switch Indicator variable identifying whether the subject's nal
choice deviates from their initial strategy (`1') or not (`0')
Session Categorical variable identifying the experimental session
Sequence Categorical variable identifying the sequence in which a sce-
nario was presented to the subject
Age Subject's age
Female Indicator variable identifying whether the subject is female
(`1') or male (`0')
Ethnicity Categorical variable indicating whether the subject is
African-American, Asian, Caucasian, Hispanic, Pacic Is-
lander, or Other
Education Categorical variable indicating whether the subject has a
high school diploma, some college, a bachelors degree, or
an advanced degree
ESL Indicator variable identifying whether English is subject's
second language (`1') or primary language (`0')
Notes:Understanding, and demographic variables (Age through ESL) are dimensioned by subject.
All other variables are dimensioned by subject-round.
35Table 4: Summary Statistics and Correlations



























































Undefeated 0:64 0:48 0 1 1368 1.00
Intuitive 0:21 0:41 0 1 1368 -0.68 1.00
Payo 0:85 0:21 0:02 1:27 1368 0.06 -0.12 1.00
Understanding 0:86 0:35 0 1 1368 0.14 -0.16 0.07 1.00
Big 0:65 0:48 0 1 1368 -0.17 0.07 0.51 0.02 1.00
Switch 0:11 0:31 0 1 1368 -0.12 0.05 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 1.00
Age 25:43 9 18 63 1278 -0.15 0.18 -0.04 -0.15 0.02 -0.04 1.00
Female 0:48 0:5 0 1 1362 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 0.06 -0.16 1.00
ESL 0:11 0:31 0 1 1362 -0.00 0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 0.03 -0.00 1.00
3
6Table 5: Distribution of subjects for categorical variables
Education Level Frequency Percent
High School 21 9.21
Some College 114 50.00
Bachelors 48 21.05
Masters 31 13.60
Doctorate / Professional 10 4.39
Other / Missing 4 1.75
Total 228 100
Ethnicity Frequency Percent




Pacic Islander 18 7.89











Table 6: The proportion of subject decisions predicted by the Undefeated and Intuitive Criterion renements.
Scenario:
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Undefeated 71.1%*** 59.7%*** 63.2%*** 55.7%*** 71.1%*** 60.5%*** 63.5%***
Dierence 11.4%* 7.5% 10.5%*
Intuitive Criterion 17.1%*** 29.4% 17.1%*** 25.9%* 15.8%*** 20.6%*** 20.9%***
Dierence -12.3%** -8.8%* -4.8%
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228 1,368
Notes: The percentages in row 1 identify the proportion of subjects whose choices conform to the
Undefeated renement. The percentages in row 2 are the dierence between the percentages in row 1
for scenarios 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6. The percentages in row 3 identify the proportion of subjects
whose choices conform to the Intuitive Criterion renement. The percentages in row 4 are the dierence
between the percentages in row 3 for scenarios 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6. The symbols in rows 1
and 3 identify whether the values are statistically signicantly dierent from 33.333%. The symbols in
rows 2 and 4 identify whether the values are statistically signicantly dierent from 0%. All test are
made using two-tail binomial tests with *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, and + p <0.10.
37Table 7: The proportion of subject decisions which comply to the Undefeated renement, dierentiated by rm
type.
Scenario:
1 2 3 4 5 6
\Big" Type 68.9%*** 49.6%*** 61.5%*** 47.3%*** 64.0%*** 53.8%***
Dierence 19.3%*** 14.2%* 10.2%+
Observations 148 141 148 150 150 158
\Small" Type 75.0%*** 75.9%*** 66.3%*** 71.8%*** 84.6%*** 75.7%***
Dierence 0.9% -5.5% 8.9%
Observations 80 87 80 78 78 70
Notes: The percentages in row 1 identify the proportion of \Big" type rms whose choices
conform to the Undefeated renement. The percentages in row 2 are the dierence between
the percentages in row 1 for scenarios 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6. The percentages in row
4 identify the proportion of \Small" type rms whose choices conform to the Undefeated
renement. The percentages in row 5 are the dierence between the percentages in row 4
for scenarios 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6. The symbols in rows 1 and 4 identify whether
the values are statistically signicantly dierent from 33.333%. The symbols in rows 2 and
5 identify whether the values are statistically signicantly dierent from 0%. All test are
made using two-tail binomial tests with *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, and + p <0.10.
Table 8: Estimating whether the predictive powers of the Undefeated and Intuitive Criterion renements are
associated with the subject's self-reported Understanding of the game.
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Undefeated Intuitive
Coecient OR Coecient OR
Understanding 0.68* 1.97* -0.91*** 0.40***
[0.28] [0.56] [0.27] [0.11]
Understanding - No Response -0.50 0.61 -1.61+ 0.20+
[0.94] [0.57] [0.94] [0.19]
Big -0.93*** 0.39*** 0.42* 1.52*
[0.17] [0.07] [0.19] [0.29]
Switch -0.83*** 0.44*** 0.44+ 1.56+
[0.22] [0.10] [0.23] [0.36]
Constant 1.01* 2.74* -1.25* 0.29*
[0.48] [1.33] [0.51] [0.15]
Observations 1,368 1,368
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.09
Mean DV 0.64 0.21
Hosmer and Lemeshow 2 12.63 5.94
Hosmer and Lemeshow p-value 0.13 0.65
Wald 2 22.46***
Notes: Logistic estimation with robust standard errors clustered by subject
in brackets. Included controls { Session, Sequence, Age, Female, Ethnicity,
Education, and ESL. The Hosmer and Lemeshow 2 test is based o of 10
groupings of the predictor variables. A large p-value for this test indicates a
good model t. Wald 2 provides a test of the equivalency of the coecient
on Understanding across models (1) and (2). *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, *
p <0.05, + p <0.10
38Table 9: Estimating whether the subject's payo depends on their choice being predicted by the Undefeated
renement or the Intuitive Criterion renement.
Dependent Variable: Payo
(1) (2) (3)
(A) Undefeated 0.04** 0.07***
[0.01] [0.01]
(B) Intuitive -0.05*** -0.08***
[0.01] [0.01]
Understanding 0.01 0.02+ 0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Understanding - No Response -0.02 -0.00 -0.03
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Big 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.22***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Switch 0.02 0.02 0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Constant 0.62*** 0.59*** 0.66***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Observations 1,368 1,368 1,368
R2 0.38 0.37 0.37
Mean DV 0.85 0.85 0.85
Wald F: (A)-(B)=0? 67.37***
Notes: OLS estimation with robust standard errors clustered by
subject in brackets. Included controls { Session, Wait, Age, Fe-
male, Ethnicity, Education, Student, and ESL. Wald tests of in-
distinguishable coecients report F statistics. *** p <0.001, **
p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10
39Appendix
Extensive Form Representations
Figure 4: Extensive form of Scenarios 3 and 4.
(a) Firm and investor payos for Scenario 3. There
is a 35% probability that the subject in the role of
the rm is randomly assigned to be a \Small" oppor-
tunity type rm. Display of information is formatted
for a rm.
(b) Firm and investor payos for Scenario 4. There
is a 35% probability that the subject in the role of
the rm is randomly assigned to be a \Small" oppor-
tunity type rm. Display of information is formatted
for an investor.
Figure 5: Extensive form of Scenarios 5 and 6.
(a) Firm and investor payos for Scenario 5. There
is a 35% probability that the subject in the role of
the rm is randomly assigned to be a \Small" oppor-
tunity type rm. Display of information is formatted
for a rm.
(b) Firm and investor payos for Scenario 6. There
is a 35% probability that the subject in the role of
the rm is randomly assigned to be a \Small" oppor-
tunity type rm. Display of information is formatted
for an investor.
40Subject Instructions Script
The script read to all subjects in the experiment is below. A copy of the presentation slides that
accompany the script is available upon request from the authors.
Slide 1. Welcome. I will rst take you through an overview of the game that you will play
and then walk you through an example that will describe exactly how you will play this game on
the computer.
Slide 2. In each round you will be randomly assigned to play either the role of a Firm or an
Investor. Firms and Investors will then be randomly and anonymously paired with dierent people
in each round.
Slide 3. Firms will either have a \Small" or \Big" market opportunity, which is just a measure
of the number of customers the Firm expects to have for its product or service. Both the Firm
and Investor will know the Firm's likelihood of getting a \Small" or \Big" market opportunity, but
only the Firm will know for sure its actual opportunity.
Slide 4. Knowing its market opportunity, the Firm will decide how many stores to open. The
Firm's payo depends not only on this decision, but on the price the Investor sets for the Firm.
Slide 5. The Investor learns how many stores the Firm will open and sets a price for the
Firm. The Investor's payo depends on setting a price close to the Firm's actual value.
Slide 6. You will see a picture similar to this in each game you play. I will cover the
information on this picture.
As I mentioned previously, in each round the Firm is randomly assigned either a \Big" market
opportunity or a \Small" market opportunity.
Slide 7. The Firm has three choices for the number of stores to open, depending on its market
opportunity. In this example, a \Big" opportunity Firm can choose to open 6, 7 or 8 stores while
a \Small" opportunity Firm can choose to open 5, 6, or 7 stores. Note that your information is
always in red and the other player's information is in blue.
Slide 8. Depending on the Firm's choice, the Investor has either no choice or three choices
for what price to set for the Firm. In this example, only a Firm with a \Big" opportunity can open
8 stores, and only Firm with a \Small" opportunity can open 5 stores. Note that both a \Big"
and a \Small" opportunity Firm can open either 6 or 7 stores. If the Investor sees one of these
choices the Investor must decide whether to set a \Big", \Small" or \Weighted" price to the Firm.
A \Weighted" price is simply a weighted average price.
Slide 9. If you are a Firm, your payo depends on the size of the opportunity, your store
choice, and the price the Investor sets. In this example, if a \Big" Firm chooses 8 stores it will get a
payo of $0.82. If, however, a \Big" Firm chooses 6 stores it will get a payo of either $1.08, $0.98
or $0.77 depending on whether the Investor sets a price of \Big", \Weighted" or \Small". Similarly,
if a \Big" Firm chooses 7 stores it will get a payo of either $1.00, $0.88 or $0.62 depending on
whether the Investor sets a price of \Big", \Weighted" or \Small".
Slide 10. If you are an Investor, your payo depends on setting a price close to the Firm's
actual value. For instance, in this example if the Firm chooses 6 stores and the Investor sets a price
of \Big", the Investor will receive a payo of $1.00 if the Firm is \Big," and a payo of $0.34 if the
Firm is instead \Small".
Slide 11. When the game begins, you will be told on screen whether you are a Firm or an
Investor and the chance the Firm has of getting a \Big" or \Small" market opportunity. You will
see a graphic with the choices and payos for your game. Firms and Investors will receive the same
information and will be asked to dene their strategies. If you are a Firm, you will be asked \If
you faced a Big market opportunity, how many stores would you open?" and \If you faced a Small
market opportunity, how many stores would you open?"
Slide 12. If you are an Investor, you will be asked \If the Firm opened X stores, what price
would you give them?"
Slide 13. The Firm's market opportunity is then randomly assigned and the Firm conrms
their store quantity choice.
41Slide 14. The Investor sees the Firm's store quantity choice and conrms the price they want
to give to the Firm.
Slide 15. The Firm and Investor learn what their pay-outs are for the previous game. Firms
and Investors swap roles. Firms and Investors are randomly assigned to new partners. Firms are
randomly assigned a \Big" or \Small" opportunity and a new game begins with potentially dierent
choices and/or pay-outs.
Slide 16. In addition to your show-up fee, you will be paid the sum of all your individual
payos from the money rounds at the end of today's session.
You should try to make as much money as possible. You are not taking money from other
players.
You are playing with other people, and they can't move forward unless you move forward.
Please make your decisions in a timely fashion, be thoughtful but move quickly.
If your screen is black it means you are waiting for another player to make a decision.
One other thing, please don't close your browser, or press next, back or refresh on the browser,
as this can disrupt the game. If you have any questions during the practice rounds, please raise
your hand, and one of us will come around and answer your question. Thank you! You may now
begin.
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